

# Adversarial examples (对抗样本)

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# Catalogue


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1. What's adversarial examples?
2. The meaning for studying adversarial examples.
3. Taxonomy of attacks
4. Taxonomy of defenses
5. Challenges in the future


# 1. What's adversarial examples?

- Adversarial examples (对抗样本) are imperceptible (不可察觉) to human but can easily fool deep neural networks in the testing stage.
- As a box-constrained optimization problem :

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x'} \quad & \|x' - x\| \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & f(x') = l', \\ & f(x) = l, \\ & l \neq l', \\ & x' \in [0, 1], \end{aligned}$$



(a)



(b)

Szegedy et al. (2014) [19]

Keep imperceptible

Keep fool model

## 2. The meaning for studying adversarial examples

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- One of the major risks for applying deep neural networks in safety-critical environments.
- Help us more deeply understand the neural networks. From inspecting adversarial examples, we may gain insights on semantic inner levels of neural networks and problematic decision boundaries.[34]

Help to increase robustness and performance!

# 3. Taxonomy (分类) of adversarial attacks

- **Adversary's Knowledge**


1. White-box attacks
2. Black-box attacks

- **Adversarial Specificity**

1. Targeted attacks
2. Non-targeted attacks

- **Attack Frequency**

1. One-time attacks
2. Iterative attacks



# Adversarial attacks

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- **L-BFGS Attack**

Szegedy et al. firstly introduced adversarial examples against deep neural networks in 2014[19]

- **Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)**

Goodfellow et al. [69]

- **Basic Iterative Method (BIM) and Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC) [20]**

- **DeepFool [71]**

- **CPPN EA Fool [83]**

- **C & W's Attack [86]**

- **Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO) [73]**

- **Universal Perturbation [74]**

- **Feature Adversary [76]**

- ... ..

# Adversarial attacks

| Applications           | Representative Study | Method                         |
|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Reinforcement Learning | [93]                 | FGSM                           |
|                        | [94]                 | FGSM                           |
| Generative Modeling    | [95]                 | Feature Adversary, C&W         |
|                        | [96]                 | Feature Adversary              |
| Face Recognition       | [67]                 | Impersonation & Dodging Attack |
| Object Detection       | [22]                 | DAG                            |
| Semantic Segmentation  | [22]                 | DAG                            |
|                        | [97]                 | ILLC                           |
|                        | [98]                 | ILLC                           |

|                       |       |                        |
|-----------------------|-------|------------------------|
| Reading Comprehension | [99]  | AddSent, AddAny        |
|                       | [100] | Reinforcement Learning |
| Malware Detection     | [101] | JSMA                   |
|                       | [102] | Reinforcement Learning |
|                       | [103] | GAN                    |
|                       | [104] | GAN                    |
|                       | [105] | Generic Programming    |

# 4. Taxonomy (分类) of Defenses

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- Network Distillation (蒸馏网络)
- Adversarial training (对抗训练)
- Classifier Robustifying




# Defenses

- **Network Distillation (蒸馏网络)**

Network distillation was originally designed to reduce the size of deep neural networks by transferring knowledge from a large networks to a small one [131].

Network distillation extracted knowledge from deep neural networks to improve robustness.[126]



# Defenses

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- **Adversarial training (对抗训练)**

Training with adversarial examples is one of the countermeasures to make neural network more robust [69][127].

Adversarial training increased the robustness of neural networks for one-step attacks (FGSM) but would not help under iterative attacks (BIM and ILLC) [81]

Adversarial trained models are more robust to white-box adversarial examples than to the transferred examples. [84]

Ensembling Adversarial Training. [84]

# Defenses

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- **Classifier Robustifying**

[128][129] designed robust architectures of deep neural networks to prevent adversarial examples.

# 5. Challenges in future

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## 1. Transferability (转移性)

- Adversarial examples generated against a neural networks can fool the same neural networks by different dataset. [19]
- Adversarial examples generated against a neural networks can fool other networks with different architectures. [44]

## 2. The existence of Adversarial examples

- Data incompleteness [19, 135, 123, 126]
- Model capability [44, 137, 69, 138, 76, 80]
- No robust model [36, 139, 140]

## 3. Robustness Evaluation

- Base-line attack
- A methodology for evaluation on the robustness of NN.

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